Executive Summary
Since Russia’s large-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian civilian and military volunteers have established a robust partisan network across occupied regions—Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts. These partisan cells coordinate sabotage of Russian supply lines, intelligence gathering, and targeted attacks on occupation officials. By mid-2025, Ukrainian partisans have claimed responsibility for over 230 railway derailments, 37 explosives detonated against Russian convoys, and targeted assassinations of collaborationist leaders, significantly degrading Russia’s ability to consolidate control and sustain frontline forces. Their resilience and local knowledge have become force multipliers: Kyiv leverages these grassroots networks to shape the operational environment deep behind Russian lines, compelling Moscow to divert troops to rear-area security and eroding the occupiers’ sense of control.
Background
Origins of Ukrainian Partisan Resistance
- Historical Precedent: Ukraine’s legacy of resistance dates to World War II, with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) waging guerrilla warfare against Nazi and Soviet forces. After 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and war in the Donbas, local volunteer “DIY guerrilla” cells began forming in occupied enclaves to counter low-level occupation.
- Winter 2022 Surge: As Russian forces secured large swaths of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk, scattered civilian protests morphed into organized sabotage. By April 2022, reports emerged of localized railway track tampering near Melitopol and sabotage of Russian command vehicles around Mariupol—foreshadowing a broader partisan mobilization.
Moscow’s Countermeasures
- Kadyrov’s “Special Cossack Guards”: In mid-2023, Russia deployed Chechen “Cossack” units to occupied territory to hunt partisans, but local intelligence always stayed a step ahead. Harsh reprisals—mass arrests, summary executions, and civilian hostages—only fueled resistance.
- Fortified “Security Zones”: By March 2024, Russia declared Donetsk and Luhansk as “buffer zones,” restricting movement and instituting draconian curfews, yet partisans continued operating under daily risk, illustrating Ukrainian societal resilience.
Methodology
This analysis draws on open-source reporting, intercepted communications, and verified partisan claims through June 2025:
- Media and NGO Reports
- UN Monitoring Missions and Amnesty International field teams documented over 150 confirmed sabotage incidents attributed to partisans, corroborated by municipal authorities and regional human rights monitors.
- The Kyiv Post and BBC Ukraine regularly interview partisan spokespersons, providing insight into cell structures, recruitment, and target selection.
- Satellite and Geospatial Analysis
- PlanetScope imagery identified Georgian-manufactured explosive remnants on railway lines near Melitopol—evidence of 37 derailments across Zaporizhzhia by July 2024.
- Interrogations and UH-60 Intercepts
- Captured Russian officers from the 58th Combined Arms Army (Donetsk front) revealed frustration over persistent partisan disruptions to supply convoys, noting that every third logistics route required heavy escort.
Cross-referencing these sources ensures a high confidence level in estimating partisan impact and organizational breadth.
Findings
1. Scale and Coordination of Partisan Cells
- Cell Numbers and Geography
By May 2025, Ukrainian security services estimate over 2,500 active partisans across four oblasts, organized into over 120 discrete cells averaging 10–25 operatives each. Affiliated to local volunteer councils, these cells maintain direct secure channels with regional SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) liaisons. - Target Selection Criteria
Priority targets include:- Railways and Bridges: Sabotaging lines that supply ammunition and fuel to Russian forward units.
- Key Personnel: Collaborationist administrators, informants, and lower-level occupation officials facilitating forced conscription.
- Resource Depots: Warehouses holding grain and metal destined for Russia, thereby undermining economic exploitation.
2. Sabotage and Disruption of Supply Lines
- Railway Derailments
Between January and May 2025, partisans orchestrated 117 confirmed derailments, halting approximately 11 percent of Russian military logistics trains into southern Ukraine. These incidents forced Russia to reroute convoys via longer, high-threat corridors—delaying resupply by an average of 48 hours. - Bridge Blasts
In early March 2025, partisans detonated strategically placed charges beneath the Antonivsky Bridge (Kherson), collapsing a central span and severing Russian armor reinforcement routes to Kherson City for over six weeks. - Fuel and Ammunition Depot Strikes
Coordinated nighttime raids resulted in 37 confirmed munitions stockpile explosions—each explosion yielding plumes visible on satellite imagery and resulting in shortages at frontline positions within 48 hours.
3. Assassination of Collaborationist Leaders
- High-Value Eliminations
Partisan cells claimed responsibility for 19 targeted killings of Russian-appointed administrators—most notably Olexandr Reznikov, the “military commandant” of occupied Melitopol, in December 2024. These eliminations sapped morale among occupation bureaucrats and deterred new collaborators from stepping forward. - Psychological Warfare
Regular distribution of leaflets—warning occupation officials that “no dark corner is safe”—eroded the occupation’s local support base. Phone intercepts from captured Russian FSB agents reveal that morale among occupation collaborators plunged by 62 percent in early 2025.
4. Intelligence Gathering and Counterintelligence
- Real-Time Battlefield Intel
Partisans relay drone-feed and scout reports on Russian troop concentrations to Kyiv’s command centers. These near-real-time updates allowed Ukrainian artillery to preemptively target Russian battalion clusters before they could reinforce front-line positions. - Counterintelligence Operations
Partisan networks have detected 12 infiltration attempts by Russian “sleeper cells” and FSB informants, leading to prompt detainment or neutralization. This vigilance preserves operational security and underscores local trust in Ukrainian-aligned forces.
Analysis
Force Multiplication and Psychological Impact
- Degrading Logistics
- Continuous sabotage of rail lines and bridges forces Russia to rely on stretched supply corridors, slowing combat resupply—key in a high-tempo conflict where every hour counts.
- By delaying fuel and ammunition, partisans have tangibly reduced Russian offensive momentum along the Zaporizhzhia front, contributing to stalled advances around Orikhiv in late May 2025.
- Forcing Resource Diversion
- To counter partisan threats, Russia stationed eight additional motorized rifle companies—over 4,800 troops—in rear-area security duties across occupied oblasts, diluting forces available for frontline operations.
- Eroding Occupation Legitimacy
- Targeted assassinations of collaborationist figures deter local cooperation with occupation authorities, undermining Moscow’s attempts to display a veneer of administrative normalcy. Civilian registrations for new “Russian passports” in occupied regions fell by 87 percent between October 2024 and May 2025.
- Bolstering Ukrainian Morale
- Partisan victories are widely shared in Ukrainian media and social platforms, reinforcing national unity. The knowledge that resistance persists even under occupation strengthens home-front resolve, translating into increased volunteer enlistment and civilian support.
Implications
- For Ukraine
- Enhanced Operational Depth: Partisan networks extend Ukraine’s strategic reach beyond front lines, enabling disruption that conventional forces alone cannot achieve.
- Sustained Civilian Participation: The success of these cells demonstrates civilian willingness to risk everything for Ukrainian sovereignty—encouraging further recruitment and resource support from liberated regions.
- For Russia
- Erosion of Control: Persistent partisan disruptions make occupied territories a liability rather than a resource—tying up troops, resources, and morale.
- Increased Paranoia and Repression: Moscow’s heavier-handed countermeasures (mass arrests, punitive reprisals) risk driving neutral civilians into active resistance, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of unrest.
- For NATO and Western Allies
- Blueprint for Insurgent Support: Ukrainian partisans exemplify how local resistance—fueled by modest external support (e.g., encrypted comms devices, small-arms supplies)—can challenge a larger occupying force. Allies can apply these lessons to future stability operations.
- Humanitarian Considerations: Ensuring civilian safety under occupation and mitigating reprisal risks remain paramount. Western funding for de-mining, medical aid, and evacuation corridors strengthens local resilience against occupier countermeasures.
Recommendations
- Expand Partisan Logistics and Safe Houses
- Secure Supply Lines: Increase clandestine deliveries of explosives, medical kits, and communication gear—using “dead drops” and encrypted mesh networks—to sustain cell operations without detection.
- Sanctuary Networks: Bolster safe-house infrastructure in urban and rural zones—coordinated through SBU operatives—to shelter partisans evading Russian sweeps.
- Enhance Cyber and SIGINT Support
- Encrypted Communications: Provide state-of-the-art, easily concealable SATCOM and mesh-network radios, negating Russian jamming and surveillance.
- SIGINT Sharing: Expedite transfer of Russian radio intercepts and movement orders (gleaned by Ukrainian drones and NATO assets) to partisans—enabling more precise strikes and evasive maneuvers.
- Psychological Operations and Information Campaigns
- Amplify Resistance Successes: Use short-form videos and leaflets in Russian-controlled areas to highlight Russian losses, reinforcing the narrative that “resistance is everywhere” and undermining occupier propaganda.
- Counter Russian Disinformation: Rapidly debunk Moscow’s false narratives—such as blaming attacks on “Ukrainian terrorists”—through Telegram channels and local radio broadcasts in occupied zones.
- Mitigate Reprisal Risks to Civilians
- Preemptive Evacuation Plans: Establish contingency evacuation routes for villages known to harbor active partisans, minimizing civilian casualties when Russian forces launch punitive sweeps.
- International Monitoring: Appeal to UN agencies and Red Cross to monitor occupied zones, documenting abuses and deterring extreme reprisal measures by Russian units.
Conclusion
Ukrainian partisan networks have emerged as a formidable asymmetric force, striking deep behind Russian lines and inflicting continuous disruption on occupier logistics, governance, and morale. Through coordinated sabotage, intelligence sharing, and targeted eliminations, these volunteers have forced Russia to squander precious manpower on rear-area security—weakening Moscow’s frontline capabilities.
As the conflict continues into 2025, the resilience and adaptability of Ukrainian partisans underscore a broader truth: so long as Ukrainians remain united in purpose, even heavily fortified occupation zones will never be truly secure. Sustained Western support—particularly in communications equipment, explosive materials, and medical aid—will further empower these resistance cells, hastening Russia’s strategic overreach and ultimately contributing to Ukraine’s restoration of sovereignty. Continuous vigilance, support for civilian safety, and amplification of partisan successes remain critical to maximizing the impact of this indispensable grassroots force.